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less
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fail

whose acquaintance with
hy the num-

to he struck

princi])al tenets of both.

Latin of

'J'he

also similar to the Sanskrit in the philosojjhical por-

tions of the \'edic writings.

no

I.EIDECKKR

sHght cannot

hetween the

])arallels

the Ilthica

F.

reader of Spinoza's

tile

linchi thinkinj^- is

ber of

KUUT

amazing than the

The

directness of both

sincerity

languages

is

and frankness with whicJT the

deepest thoughts are expressed.

Hindu philosophy had reached

a height of insight

ginnings of western philosophy were, to

all

when

appearance,

the belost in

still

But the precocity of India
long period of slumber, as it were, which con-

speculations about the physical world.

was followed by
tinues almost

a

down

to the present.

The

schools that in later years

engaged in hot disputes all seem to be below the level which had
been attained long ago, while the principles set forth in Yedic times
stand unshaken in their Himalayan solitude.

been a continrous
intact
istic

efifort to

and buttress them.

In the

West

there has

build up idealistic systems, to keep

The strong

critical

them

tendency character-

of the western attitude threatened to tear

down

the

noblest

were meant
peaks. Eternal truths one

structures, the highest ideas, wdiereas in India debates

only for raising the highest to yet loftier
left

untouched

in their original

formulation with a piety

known

onlv

to Orientals.

The

short,

archaic ])hrases and definitions

of

the

L'jianishads

which we here make the basis of our comparison, are still the living heritage of India, and the forms which
their highest speculations assumed are even now, after so manv
centuries, considered ader|uate and concise. Tlie\" may be looked
upon as Propositions reduced to the lowest terms for mnemonic

and cognate

literature,

purposes and, thus,

in

more than one way

si\ggest a

comparison with

Spinoza's geometrical treatment of philosophy.

Any

explanation of the parallelism on the basis of a direct con-

nection between the cabalistic tradition in Hebraism, to whose influence Spinoza

was doubtless verv

be more than precarious.

commust
lacking, and

receptive, with an Oriental

plex of philosophic ideas to which India

may have

contributed,

Tlie historic continin'tv

is

there are other elements that tend to frustrate anv such attempt.

:
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The

possibility of such a transmission, of course, remains.

But from

another angle the parallelism appears in a most interesting light as
being grounded in the nature of thought itself. If philosophy is the

endeavor to describe adequately reality and has, as such, any oball, identical points of view must lead to identical

jective value at

Time has nothing

results in the formulation of their findings.

with truth,

if

there

is

any absolute

truth, while language

accident and does not influence substantially the meaning

With such an

to convey.

we

interpretation

shall find

compare the Spinozistic philosophical ideas and

to

it

to

do

is

but an

it

wishes

not difficult

ideals with their

Indian prototypes.

God

brahman

the ultimate for Spinoza,

is

Both are substances,

Spinoza's

in

sense.

that for the Hindus.

Prop.

"Existence belongs to the nature of substance."

7,

Part

I

reads

God, thus, exists
The Brhadaran-

from all eternity, being the principle of all that is.
yaka Upanishad says "Truly, this world was brahman in the beginning" (1. 4. 10). This is not to be understood as implying that
"In the beginning" means in
it became something difiE^rent later.
principle. In other words, brahman exists as world-ground from all
eternity. At one time, Spinoza made use of the Scholastic term
:

causa essendi, implying that

God

is

the cause and existence of

This

things (Cor. to Prop. 24, Pt. I).

all

states excellently the Indian

position.

Substance
lows an

is

infinite

(Prop.

8,

and from its nature folmodes (Prop. 16). The attri-

Pt. I),

infinity of things in infinite

butes of God, like everything that expresses the infinite substance,

two
the

Man knows

God only these
God being all in Spinoza as well as in
Brahmanical philosophy we would expect in the latter similar

are infinite.
;

of the infinite attributes of

extension and thought.

indications as to the nature of this world.

monest attributes of brahman
limitless,

meet

it

The

infinite.

in Maitri

cal infinitude.

Up.

is

negation

6.

17,

that

it

of

all

is

Indeed, one of the comendless, ananfa, that
spacial limitation,

is,

we

as

can mean nothing else but mathemati-

In the Svetasvatara Up.

5.

13 the highest reality

is

anddhyananfam, without beginning and without
end. When Gautama Aruni went to Jaibali to receive instruction
in the highest metaphysical knowledge and the latter was not im-

characterized

as

mediately disposed to give
I

have

it

to him, he says:

of rugs, of apparel.

"It

is

well

known

that

cows and horses, of female slaves,
Be not tmgenerous toward me. Sir, in regard

a full share of gold, of
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to that
6.

2.

which

is

the abundant, the infinite, the unhniited"

II lime's

in

7,
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(

Up.

l'>rh.

words, knowledge con-

In other

translation).

topic of the EfJiica was sought, and if the ensuing dissomewhat shrouded and runs along different lines, we
must make due allowance for the ritualistic background of the Upanishads. The im])ortant thing to note is that hrahman was conceived
by these early Hindus mrch in the same way as Spinoza conceived

cerning

tile

cussion

is

his substance.

The

may

infinity of attributes

be latent

another passage of

in

same I'panishad where hrahman is spoken of as "tens and thousands, many and endless" (2. 5. 19). At any rate, space and knowledge share with hrahman the quality of ananta. Space, akasa, is
endless in Chandogya X'p. 1. 9. 2. The "great Being," which is just
a mass of intelligence (vljudnaghaua) is infinite and limitless in
the

,

Brh.

2. 4.

12.

Yajnavalkya. to

regarded mind (manas) as

infinite

the statement

(ib.

3.

1.

is

ascribed, also

9).

appears as well substantiated thought

\\'hat

tem we meet
tain

whom

S])inoza's

in

sys-

Upanishads as sim]:)le postulates. But as ceras deep reflection must have ]ireceded the almost aphoristic
in the

I'panishadic sentences, so certain

it

Spinoza's immortal book were not

won bv deduction from

oms and

is

that the finest

insights

definitions.

Practically every other characteristic of Sjiinoza's substance

be paralleled by references to the I'pani shads.

Cod

asserts that

pendent
words,

in

the axi-

constrained by nothing: he, therefore,

is

in the fullest sense,

an idea expressed

but especially by svatantra.

reliance, a

may

The 27th Proposition
in

is

inde-

Sanskrit by

manv

which convevs complete

term apparentlv much liked by the

^Nlaitri

self-

L'panishad.

Eternity, infinitinle as to time, or the absence of a when, before, and
after (Schol. 2 to Prop.

frequent adjectives in

and saiiatana, both
not reach Cod. he
tion,

?>?t,

God nnd

19th Proposition of

is

and

metaphysics.

in application to
is

particidarlv predicated in the

his attributes,

PTindu

hrahman.

it

is

also one of the

The words

are

Cause and

nitya

effect

do

not and never has been implicated in this rela-

having existed from

as the

T)

V\.

Upanishads have

all

eternity unproduced. or

unborn (aja),

it.

.\n echo of the eternal Acritv as

which Sjiinoza designates the

existence as well as the essence of substance (Schol. 2 to Prop. 8

and Cor.'s

1

and 2

to Prop. 20.

Pt. 1)

mav

be seen

in

that both,

being and truth, are predicated of or identified with hraJiman. That
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intense desire on the part of Spinoza to

being which makes

itself

make God

the most perfect

feU throughout the Ethics,

is

also seen in

Upanishads which deny every quality that may be
met in ordinary experience to brahman it is iieti, neti, not this, not
that, so it may not be confused with anything in the perceptual
world. Brahiiiaii must be left in its grandeur and sublimitv. And.
every

line of the

:

likewise, Spinoza does not want to abandon himself to anything less
consummate. There is no need for him to describe God as beyond
good and evil. It follows from the utter transcendency of all that
appertains to him directly, and the same position is held by the Indian speculators. Good and evil are human notions formed after a
comparison of things with one another (see Ethica, preface to Pt.
4). The parallel Indian view in these matters has often enough been

commented upon and need not be reiterated here.
It would not concur with the facts if we interpreted Spinoza's
God as being pure mind. We would limit him thus decidedly. Nevertheless,

he

is

the ultimate cause, the efficient cause of the existence

as well as essence of

he

all

things (Pt.

I,

Prop. 25

etc.).

In addition,

thinking being, while, according to the most important seventh

is

Proposition of the second Part, his power to think

is

equal to his

power to act. There is a double aspect which is also apparent in later Hindu speculation, where the highest being "shines
forth" in and through the whole manifestation. The process of
virtual

creation itself

is

always described cautiously as a "shining forth"
is chosen to indicate the subtleness

This neutral term

(prakasa).

of the development which has 'both, an apparently logical

and an

apparently physical aspect which mingle in the significant concept
iiidyd.

we

To

call

this also there are parallels in Spinoza.

For the moment
Western view

attention only to the circumstance that the

markedly from the Hindu one if some sort of a dualism is
it which Spinoza, however, never intended.
The whole creation is God's pleasure, and none of the motives

differs

read into

ascribed to

God by

ation of the world.

theology can be predicated of him in the cre-

This

is

a typically Eastern view which, in Spi-

noza, reaches beyond the Hebraic idea of the absolute

despot to that so generally held at

all

power of

a

times in India, of Siva's dance

which conveys the utter inconceivability of any ultimate design in
Man cannot fathom the purpose of the whole, and Spinoza does not hesitate to stigmatize all final causes as nothing more
creation.

than

human

fictions.

No

thinker ever was fiercer in criticizing an-

;
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A seeniinj^ exce])tion is the dcus sivc
which is the perfect parallel to the Hindu use of the mascupronoun sa for the neuter demonstrative tat in application to

thropomorpliic tendencies.
uatiira,
line

the ultimate reality.

On

both sides

we

look

more

of tolerance than of compromise for an exjilanation.
like the

forbidding substance,

stacles in the

way

is

of a mystical realization,

brahman,

like

is

the direction

The pure

"It,"

and puts greater obwhich neither the Hindus

less satisfying

nor Spinoza rebuked, brt rather invited,

God.

in

tacitly.

one. cka, without a second, advaita.

In

number of ways this is also given expression to throughout the
Ethics. The problem, however, is how can this One become the
many, how can the cka be this world-all, sarvam idam, or how are
the attributes related to the one and only substance. Here Spinoza's
answer varies somewhat from that of the Hindus. Spinoza lodges
the entire responsibility for the many in God himself from whose
a

omnipotence and

infinite

Proposition of the

first

nature there follows, according to the 16th

Part, an infinity of things in infinite modes,

while the infinity of attributes
definition of

God

for him. contained already in the

is,

as the absolute being.

clined to the belief that the

One

is

The Hindu has always inmany appearance

reality, the

but again. Eastern and Western thought approach each other, for
if hrahman is everything, the appearance or maya must be bound
up inextricably with brahman also not that he too were maya, but
that the maya is his maya.
The metaphysical speculation of the Hindus turns around the
two poles of brahman and dtman, the human soul or self as the writ
small of brahman. Spinoza comes very close to such a conception
in the second and the two last parts of the Ethics. When the Upanishads are in search of what is abiding, eternal, they teach to find it
in the atman, which is identical with braiunan. The soul, in Spi-

—

noza's system,

is

eternal also, in so far as

with God. and not

it

is

in essence identical

body having a cerThat is made plain in the Hindu view likewise where,
in order to convey the subtlety of atman, the pupil is made to realize
that neither the body nor what we would call the "me." can be the
atman that is eternal and may be regarded as connatural with brahman (cf., e.g.. Chand. Up. 8. 7 fif.).
Many are the adjectives applied to atman, and we need not be
surprised at finding them also in various places of the EfJiics, inasmuch as a fundamental conception in a metaphysical system intain duration.

in so far as

it

is

the soul of a
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evitablv admits conclusions with respect to

So, that the sorl

is

Y), which

23, Pt.

is

edge, realization, Z'idyd, jnana,
this intrinsic relationship.

The

meaning imis knowlwith brahman

essence of atman

and thus

identical

is

Similarly Spinoza says in the Corol-

lary to the 11th Proposition (Pt. TI), that the

of the infinite intelligence of God.

and

death (Prop.

at

paralleled by the Sanskrit aksara,

perishable, in application to atman.

by

other characteristics.

its

not destroyed along with the body

JNlan

human

soul

part

is

conceives through God,

conceiving and perceiving conceives and perceives nothing

in

man so perceives and conknowledge of God. The same holds good
of dfniaii and hrahinan which is said to be sarvam idani, the whole
world, as well as adhyatman, that is, Emerson's Oversoul.
The three kinds of knowledge distinguished by Spinoza in the
second Part of the Ethics we find also in the Upanishads. Opinion
but

God

^loreover, inasfar as

again.

ceives he has an adequate

or imagination, representing the

The term

inadequate.

means
is

and which

to opine

the higher reality.

by reason,

it

first

kind of knowledge,

applied to such knowledge

As

is

never used

to the

when

is

the object involved

second kind of knowledge mediated

related to that of the third kind, intuition.

is

wholly

is

man, which

They

are

adeqrate. and z'idyd and judna are likewise fully satisfactory with

any of its forms. The peculiar quality of unand wavering is typical of opinion. Real
knowledge is positive and certain as Spinoza says, certainty is not
a mere privation or absence of doubt. Truth is self-evident and prerespect to

brahman

in

certainty, doubt, hesitation,

:

cludes

doubt.

all

"As

the light

makes manifest both

itself

darkness, so does truth reveal both itself and that which
(Schol. to 43rd Prop.).

cvam veda,

shadic ya

Truth

is

thing-

it

:

''he

false"

equal depth and assurance the Upani-

who knows

rings

this,"

into

our

ears.

not an extrinsic correspondence between an idea and a
is

identical with itself.

aside

P)Ut

AA'ith

and the
is

from these

characteristics

of

knowledge there are

others which are exhibited with striking similarity by the Eastern

and Western thinkers.

Plow often do we read

in

the

Upanishads

of crossing the fearful stream of knowledge, or successfully reach-

ing the other shore which

sorrow

!

Spinoza, too,

pels the fear of error

knowledge of God
28 of Part TV.

is

And

tells

beyond darkness, or surmounting
us how truth, as true knowledge, dislies

and uncertainty. Knowledge is a good, while
the supreme good, according to Proposition
a little farther

down we

read analogously to
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the Plindu desire for bralniun'idyd, knowledge of hralniuni, that the

highest happiness

(Demon,

of

The

good

in

\irtue

])racticc

/;ra//;;/<;-knower

and so

evil in virtue of insight,

the

who

those

Prop. 36).

to

know

to

is

definitely

is

("lod

heyond

S])inoza's ideal thinker has attained

the luriitis vita in which nothing of evil

may

hefall him.

His rnderstanding protects him sufficiently and insures him acquiescence and contentment of mind, just as the Hindu sage enjoys
highest hliss and ha])piness.

0)10)1(10,

Sj)inoza does not

know

the concept Didyo as such which has so

frequently heen interpreted as deception, delusion, and

w hich

is

in reality

fraud, hut

appearance or what we, philosophically speaking,

designate as phencnnenon.

The

however,

idea,

kind of knowledge just alluded

latent in the first

is

as well as in

to,

what Spinoza

the passion of the soul which ]:)roduces confused ideas.

calls

MdyCi, like

and sulYering and thus makes liberamoksa, highly desirable. Having gone that far, the Hindus and

the passions, produces sorrow
tion,

S])inoza have to go one

more

step.

They have

to find

means and

ways, not to salvation as such, which would be a religious problem,
but to peace of mind.

number

It is

obvious what Spinoza demands:

reduc-

what is equivalent to it. lessening the frequency of our passions and increasing true knowdedge.

ing the

In

of inadequate ideas, or,

India practically the identical

solutions

recommended for many centuries.
The Hindu sees kd))io, desire, at

have been found and

the root of sorrow

and sufferand melancholy. De-

ing.

In Spinoza's terminology

sire,

so our philosopher explains in the 57th Proposition (Pt. Ill),

it is

the very essence of passion.

is itself

difference between the thinkers

however, into a
sire

reason,

it is

fine discrimination

And

productive of good.

here

we

perceive a slight

are comparing, which resolves,

on the part of each of them. De-

This

is

As long

it is guided by
by the insistence

as

paralleled

I panishads on restraint of the activity of the sensorv ap-

paratus.

^^^hat

literally the

noza

we

able to cause both, good and evil.

is

in the

pain, grief,

Spinoza

calls

ambition has

I-maker, of the \'edic

restricts

Hindus view

its

literat'-re.

prototype

in aJioiiikdra.

In his definition. Spi-

ambition to immoderate desire of glory, while the
the whole of individual existence as under the aspect

But why is melancholy and sorrow evil?
Because they inhibit action, and the power of the bodv is lessened
and restrained (Demon, to Prop. 42, Pt. 4).

of a self-limiting process.

And

thus

we come

to the goal

of

all

philosophy which

lies

in
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At

attaining happiness, ananda.

the close of the second Part Spi-

noza admits that his doctrine confers entire peace of mind. Joy,
lactitia, is the object, and in attaining it we attain happiness at the
same time. Spinoza does not mean merely the affections of the body,
as laughing and the like, but the deeper joys of a spiritual life which

power to act. The good is the action, joyous doing.
Gayety and cheerfulness (hilaritas) are always good, and there may
never be an excess of either. In fact, "the more joyfully we feel,
in other
the higher is the state of perfection to which we pass,
increase our

—

we

words, the more do
(Schol.

2,

necessarily participate in the Divine nature"

Prop. 45, Pt. 4). There

from Hindu literatrre to
ophy is permeated by the

is

no need of adducing examples
whole of Indian philos-

illustrate that the

desire to reach the state of boundless bliss.

What

links Spinoza so closely to this eastern thought

more

fearlessly than other

philosophers, insisted

cannot be the end of philosophy, but that

municates

What

is

from the mind

itself

especially significant

is

to the

that

is

that he,

speculation

is happiness which comwhole of the personality.
it

that Spinoza's, as the Hindu's, anan-

da depends on knowledge in the sense in which it has been explained
above. This is brought out especially in the 27th Proposition to
Part y. And as the Hindus define the highest reality, brahman,
in

terms of

bliss,

so Spinoza says that beatitude

is

not the reward

Happiness needs no justification, and
of virtue, but
it needs no sacrifice.
That action and a positive adjustment to life
constitute the source and end of happiness, is also the theme of
the Bhagavad Gita which among the religious books of India is most
is

virtue itself.

popular.
It is

the philosopher in

qrate expression.

whom

Spinoza has

the life of the spirit

left us a brief

comes

to ade-

sketch in the Ethics

which mig-ht be taken as a sort of autobiography. In pointing to
some of the characteristics of his ideal philosopher it is hardly necessary to parallel them one by one bv those predicated of the
iiylsin, the

Indian wise man.

The one

sai'n-

perfectly reflects the other.

.Spinozism teaches to hate no-one. to despise no-one, to ridicule noone, to be angry with no-one, to envy no-one (end of Pt. II), in

one word to preserve the Stoical
srpcrstition are not
aufl

marks of

calmness.

the wise

Pity, partiality,

man, but

thought and action in accordance with one's

and Schol.
The following sentence by Spinoza
hlidva, in Sanskrit (cf. ib.

to Prop.'s 18
is

and

a life of reason

own

nature, sva-

and 35 of

Pt.

IV).

the key that unlocks the un-
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derstanding to the ancient ideal, be

man

wise

than the
1

:

"There

is

man who

lives

to Prop. 35, Pt. IV).

philosophy

is

in

nature more useful to

man

according to the dictates of reason" (Cor.

The

old prejudice of the impracticality of

Contentment, peace of mind, contem-

thus dispelled.

plativeness, action, reason and, above

which see Prop. 39 of

Eastern or Western, of the

it

no single thing
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Pt.

all,

balance throughout (for

IV) have a tangible

effect not only

on

the individual possessed of these, but on society as well.
It is

man

important that Spinoza interpreted the attitude of the wise

also religiously as piety (see Schol. to Prop. 37, Pt. 4)

corresponds with the Indian
cated especially

conce]:)tion of

the llhagavad CTtfi.

l)y

which

hhakti, devotion, incul-

The dictum,

to live virtue

rather than to expunge evil (see end of Pt. IV), is at once Oriental
and modern. The man of reason, Spinoza says, should live in soThis might be considered quite antagonistic to the Eastern
ciety.
only seemingly so, perhaps, for the wise man of the Upaniideal
shadic age, though he may be leaving his family and repairing to
the forest, is seen going from place to place, teaching and taking
;

part in philosophical discussions.

The Upanishads

are emphatic in drawing a distinction between

knowledge, vidya, and ignorance, azndyd, the
trous consequences
fools

;

;

the Stoics divided

latter leading to disas-

mankind

in

wise

men and

Spinoza, likewise, stresses more than once that the wise great-

ly excel the ignorant.

And

thus, while there are a

few points on

which Spinoza disagrees with the Eastern thinkers, it
damental conceptions that he agrees with them. The

is

in the

noza, by race, belonged to an Oriental people accounts for
similarities in the

what

is

ceptions

temperamental and

intellectual

of far greater practical significance

is,

fun-

fact that Spi-

disposition.

many
But

that there are con-

which are above time and place and circumstance, and
undaunted and autochthonic vigor in Orient

that they are voiced with

and Occident
in

alike, at different stages of the history of

various tongues.

mankind and

